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ABSTRACT
Jointly-accessible resources used by multiple individuals
are often endangered. Indeed, we call the supposedly
inevitable destruction of such resources "the tragedy of the
commons". Commons problems have been classified with other
"social traps" such as the collective action problem and the
Prisoner's Dilemma game. Reasoning by analogy and metaphor
from these other "traps" has yielded a general prognosis of
doom for the commons, escapable only via privatization of
the resource or centralized public management.
In fact, alternative organizations of resource use exist,
and have led to resource preservation and even to resource
enhancement. The question is how, and under what
conditions, users of a common resource might collectively
coordinate their behavior to avoid impending doom and
enhance resource use without resort to either of the forms
prescribed in the prevailing literature. Drawing upon the
methods of institutional analysis and the experience of
actual cases of commons management, this paper presents
descriptive and quantitative evidence on: (a) the relevant
characteristics of the settings in which resource users
operate, (b) the steps taken in a process of resolution of a
commons dilemma, and (c) the results obtained thus far by
the users of groundwater basins in arid and heavily
populated portions of southern California. The likelihood
of successful resolution is compared across different
settings, and the efficiency and equity of different public-
private organizational form mixes are compared, as well.
GETTING OUT OF THE COMMONS TRAP:
VARIABLES, PROCESS, AND RESULTS
IN FOUR GROUNDWATER BASINS
A commons (or a common-pool resource) is a resource
that is not under the ownership of an individual, to which
more than one individual has access, and that generates
subtractable yields that are appropriated by the individuals
who have access to that resource. Among the several
examples of jointly-accessible resources that produce
separately appropriable yields are forests, fisheries,
grazing lands, surface bodies of water, and groundwater
basins. Following the typology of goods presented by Ostrom
and Ostrom (1978: 12), common-pool resources exhibit
relatively lower feasibility of exclusion than do private
goods, and relatively higher subtractability in use than do
public goods. This combination, in the absence of some
arrangements to control use, renders common-pool resources
susceptible to problems of overuse, depletion, and even
destruction. When several individuals use a jointly-
accessible yet subtractable resource, the resource can be in
danger. This is not merely an abstract or theoretical
threat — examples of overused, depleted, and destroyed
forests, fisheries, grazing lands, surface bodies of water,
and groundwater basins exist.
I. The Commons as "Social Trap"
Because the dangers that threaten common-pool resources
inhere in their defining characteristics (i.e., multiple
access to the resource, non-ownership, and subtractability
of the yield), overuse, depletion, and destruction have been
thought to be the inalterable fate of all such resources.
Indeed, we have coined the phrase "the tragedy of the
commons11 (G. Hardin, 1968) for their supposedly inevitable
destruction. Commons problems have been classed as "social
traps" — situations in which individually rational actions
produce socially undesirable outcomes — and analyzed
together with other "traps". Escapes therefrom have been
prescribed together, as well.
A. The Metaphors
The reasoning of Garrett Hardin, asserting that the
"inherent logic of the commons remorselessly generates
tragedy" (1968: 1244), appeared in print shortly after the
publication of Mancur Olson's The Logic of Collective
Action. Hardin's article described collective destruction
brought on by the uncontrolled, but nonetheless rational,
actions of individuals. Olson's book described collective
benefits foregone as a result of the uncoerced, rational
actions of individuals. The problems presented by the two
authors appeared as opposite sides of the same coin: the
"tragedy of the commons" was just the "collective action
problem" in reverse. Failure to stop the destruction of a
valued good — or, put another way, failure to avert a "bad"
(Buchanan, 1970) — was essentially the same as failure to
produce a valued good. Either case was a "social trap".
The equating of the collective action problem with the
"tragedy of the commons" overlooked the fact that Olson was
writing about public goods and Hardin about common-pool
resources. This was understandable, since Olson defined
public goods in terms of the one characteristic they share
with common-pool resources, viz., low feasibility of
exclusion. And indeed, non-excludability is a key to
understanding why individuals might not act to reduce their
use of an overused resource. Reduction of use by an
individual may improve the conditions of the resource, but
the benefits from that reduction cannot be captured by the
individual who reduces use. The benefits of reduced use are
shared by all users. And, in Olson's analysis of the public
goods problem, it is precisely this inability of the
individual who considers contributing to the collective
benefit to exclude non-contributors from sharing in the gain
that generates the predicted failure of collective action.
Commons problems thus appeared to be an interesting subset
of collective action problems.
Another "social trap" was attracting attention at the
time of scholars' interest in the theory of public goods and
Olson's collective action problem. Game theory's Prisoner's
Dilemma captures in an essential and formal manner the
problem of collective detriment realized as a result of the
pursuit of individual benefit. Independent decision-makers
operate in a context where their fates are linked to each
other's choices, much as is the case with multiple users of
a jointly-accessible yet subtractable resource.
The set of outcomes of a Prisoner's Dilemma game relate
directly to the outcomes obtainable in the use of a commons.
There is an individual's best outcome when others exercise
restraint while the individual does not, a second-best
outcome when all actors exercise restraint, a third-best
outcome when all actors do not exercise restraint, and a
worst outcome when the individual exercises restraint and
other actors do not. If all individuals pursue their best
outcomes, all do not exercise restraint, and the joint
result of their individual choices is that they realize
their third-best outcome rather than their best or second-
best. And yet this result is exactly what game theorists
predicted for Prisoner's Dilemma situations, which was in
accord with the "tragedy of the commons" predictions, as
well. Indeed, Dawes and colleagues developed and presented
a particular for of N-person Prisoner's Dilemma which they
called the "commons dilemma game" (Dawes, 1973; Dawes et
al., 1977). Commons problems thus appeared to be an
interesting subset of the Prisoner's Dilemma game.
The Prisoner's Dilemma game and the collective action
problem were themselves linked as types of "social traps".
Russell Hardin observed that the "problem of collective
action in social contexts is the Prisoner's Dilemma writ
large" (1982: xiii). Thomas Schelling united the collective
action problem, the Prisoner's Dilemma, and the commons in
his deservedly widely-read Micromotives and Macrobehavior.
Whether social scientists had identified the genus "Social
Trap", of which "Collective Action," "Prisoner's Dilemma,"
and "Tragedy of the Commons11 were species, or had identified
the species "Social Trap" for which these other names were
merely colloquial descriptors without distinguishing
relevance, was unclear. But it was clear that the three
were at least linked, if not outright interchangeable.
B. The Solutions
The logic of the Prisoner's Dilemma, the "logic of
collective action," and "the inherent logic of the commons"
all lead to one conclusion: individuals will not cooperate
in their use of a common resource and indeed will pursue
strategies leading to the destruction of that resource.
Based on this "social trap" logic, scholars have made
recommendations for the organization of resource use that
would provide an escape from the commons trap.
These "escapes" involve conversion of the resource from
common property to some other form of property. They are
based upon a conviction that as long as the commons remains
a commons. its "inherent logic" does indeed "inexorably lead
to destruction." Because the commons is conceived as
identical to a collective action problem in the provision of
a public good and to a Prisoner's Dilemma, it is conceived
as equally intractable as these problems. Only centrally-
directed coercion to make people behave responsibly in their
interdependent situation (G. Hardin, 1968; Carruthers and
Stoner, 1982), or privatization that eliminates the
interdependence itself and divides the commons anew among
independent proprietors (T. Anderson, 1983; Welch, 1983; R.
Smith, 1981) can avert the destruction of resources and
enhance the efficiency and equity of their use. To one
group of scholars, only the centralized management of
resources as public property could work. To another group
of scholars, only the individual ownership of resources as
private property could work.
The opposition of these two "solutions'* has led another
set of scholars to speculate on their actual validity.
Since the advocates of each approach contend for their
solution as the only way for resources to be saved, it is
clear that both cannot be correct. The question then arises
whether in fact either approach can substantiate a claim
that it alone can provide for resource preservation and
enhancement. Other scholars, who have studied cases of
resource management in actual settings across different time
periods, resource types, and locations, have found that
cases of resource destruction can be found under a variety
of forms of organization of resource use, and that cases of
resource preservation and enhancement can be found under a
variety of forms of organization of resource use (see, for
example, E. Ostrom, 1986; Panel on Common Property Resource
Management, 1986).
II. Development of a Process-Based Alternative
A. The Seeds of an Alternative Approach
The metaphors that were used to illuminate the commons
problem and came to be treated as identical with it — the
collective action problem and the Prisoner's Dilemma game —
led to the conclusion that there was no way out of the
commons trap (save for re-organizing the commons as
something else). Yet at the same time, those metaphors
contained the seeds of another approach.
Our understanding of the collective action problem, as
initially elaborated by Mancur Olson and as revisited by
Russell Hardin, yielded some important clues as to how
certain collective-action situations might differ from one
another in ways that made for more promising prospects in
some cases than in others. Some of the clues are direct: if
collective action is more likely in some cases than in
others, perhaps an analogous increase in likelihood of
resolution of resource problems might also occur. Some of
the clues are indirect, and depend upon our recognizing the
differences between a commons situation and a collective-
action situation: if a particular characteristic of
collective-action situations presents a barrier to
successful collective action, and if that same
characteristic is not present in commons problems, then
perhaps it indicates a greater opportunity for resolving
commons problems.
Among the clues from the analysis of collective action
are:
(a) the larger the group of potential contributors (or, by
analogy, resource users), ceteris paribus. the lower
the prospects for successful collective action;
(b) the more concentrated the distribution of interests in
the desired good (or the resource), ceteris paribus.
the greater the chances for successful collective
action, as there may be some individual or some
efficacious subgroup capable of producing the desired
result;
(c) the greater the extent of other interactions among the
members of the group, ceteris paribus. the greater the
prospects that they will cooperate in achieving some
joint benefit;
(d) because the essence of the public-goods provision
problem lies in the inability to exclude non-
contributors from receiving benefits (or conversely,
the inability to coerce contributions from benefit
recipients), we surmise that if users of a common-pool
resource are able in some way to exclude others or to
compel their behavior, their prospects of successfully
managing the resource may improve.
Our understanding of the Prisoner's Dilemma game, from
a wide variety of scholars, has also yielded direct and
indirect clues concerning the likelihood of obtaining more
desirable outcomes. These clues include:
(a) the greater the anticipation of future iterations of
the sane situation, ceteris paribus. the more likely
players (or resource users) are to develop strategies
that improve on the strategy of consistent non-
cooperation ;
(b) the more communication allowed between players, ceteris
paribus. the greater the likelihood of cooperative
actions;
(c) if players are able to make and sustain enforceable
threats of sanctions for non-cooperation, ceteris
paribus. the likelihood of cooperative action increases
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(d) players in a Prisoner's Dilemma game make their choices
in isolation from one another; if users of a common-
pool resource are able to observe and monitor each
other's behavior, this would represent a significant
difference between the two situations.
In addition to these deriving from the analysis of
collective action problems and Prisoner's Dilemma games,
there are some inductive generalizations arising from the
set of scholars engaged in direct observation of common-pool
cases. Among these are:
(a) where a resource is part of a series of interconnected
resources, its location in that series (e.g.,
"downstream" vs. "upstream") affects the likelihood of
the resource users taking action to preserve and manage
it, with "downstream" users more likely to act than
"upstream" users;
(b) the greater the physical area covered by a resource,
ceteris paribus. the less likely it is to be
successfully preserved and managed, especially by its
users;
(c) the more visible the resource and its boundaries,
ceteris paribus. the more likely it is that its users
will act to preserve and manage it;
(d) the more stable and homogeneous the group of users,
ceteris paribus. the more likely they are to
successfully act to preserve and manage the resource;
(e) the more resource information (or at least access to
information-gathering facilities) users have, ceteris
paribus. the more likely they are to act successfully
to preserve and manage the resource;
(f) the greater the degree of real control resource users
can have in organizing a resource management system for
their situation, ceteris paribus. the more likely they
are to act successfully to preserve and manage the
resource.
These several clues are the seeds of an alternative
approach to the commons in the sense that they suggest that
the prospects for a particular commons might not be as bleak
as the "social trap" metaphors and the "inherent logic"
reasoning lead one to believe. And if this is so, then
resolutions of commons problems may indeed be feasible that
do not rely on the imposition of centralized public
management or the transformation of the commons into parcels
of private property. Moreover, resource users themselves,
rather than omniscient regulators, may be the source and
engine of the preservation and enhancement of their own
common resources. The next step in the development of the
alternative approach is the consideration of what such a
user-based resolution of a commons problem would entail.
B. The Alternative Approach: Process and Variables
Resolution of a commons problem so as to maintain
access for several individuals while keeping aggregate use
levels within the capacity of the resource to generate
appropriable yields of desirable quality is a complex
pursuit. The necessary components of this pursuit can be
described briefly as steps in a user-based process (an
elaborated, some might say laborious, description is
available in Blomquist, 1987: 126-135).
There is no presumption that these steps must be taken
either completely privately or completely publicly. Users
may in some cases find it to their advantage to avail
themselves of existing public capacities, such as expert
agencies and courts, and in others to create and control
private associations or even to operate with informal
private arrangements.
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Regardless of the mix of private and public capacities,
if they are to develop their own resolution of a commons
problem and to achieve optimal use of the resource, users
will have to:
(1) develop accurate and sufficiently detailed information
about the resource, in order (among other things) to
calibrate aggregate use and the total sustainable yield
of the resource;
(2) create or adapt some media and form of communication;
(3) establish some collective decision-making mechanism
with appropriate boundaries;
(4) adopt a cost-sharing formula;
(5) assign rights of access and use
(6) establish sanctions for non-conforming behavior; and
(7) develop a monitoring mechanism.
It is important to note that this is a fairly "generic"
list. There is little presumption of the particular forms
and features that these monitoring mechanisms, collective
decision-making mechanisms, sanctions, media and fora of
communication, etc. will take. There is only the statement
that something that counts as a monitoring arrangement, etc.
will have to exist. Indeed, based on review of actual
commons experiences around the world and across time, we
expect variety rather than uniformity in resource-management
efforts and techniques.
We also do not anticipate that all users will undertake
this process in all endangered resources, nor that users
will succeed in completing all of the process everywhere
that they begin it, nor that completion of the process
ensures lasting success at resource management. The
prospects for initiation of the process, for completion, and
for lasting success are in turn conditioned by a set of
variables making resolution more or less likely. Those
variables, now grouped together as "attributes of the
resource", "attributes of the users", and "attributes of
institutional capacity", are a compilation of the "seeds"
discussed above — characteristics of a resource situation
that can affect the chances for successful resource
preservation and management. They, too, can be listed
briefly below (a more thorough presentation also appears in
Blomquist, 1987: 136-153):
Attributes of the Resource:
— rate of renewability of the resource;
— condition of the resource;
— location of the resource (if part of a series);
— size of the resource;
— visibility of the resource;
Attributes of the Users:
— size of the group;
— distribution of interests within the group;
— homogeneity of the group;
— wealth and income of the group;
— extent of other interactions among users;
— stability of the user group and of their use of the
resource;
— time horizon of the users;
— availability of an alternative supply for these users of
whatever yield they value from the resource;
Attributes of Institutional Capacity:
— degree of real control users can have in designing and
implementing resource management;
— availability of facilities for information-gathering;
— ability to make and sustain enforceable agreements;
— presence of an institution with several of the needed
capacities.
With the specification of this process and this set of
variables, we are in a position to pursue an alternative to
the two "solutions" that have prevailed in the literature on
the commons. There are two tasks to be pursued in an
examination of some common-pool cases in actual settings.
First, we seek to establish the possibility that common-pool
resources might be preserved, and even enhanced, without
resort to either of the forms of solution advanced in the
literature. This can be done by identifying a case or cases
that have followed neither a centralized public management
nor a privatization approach and yet where the "tragedy of
the commons" has been overcome. Second, we wish to
ascertain the utility of a process-based alternative
approach to understanding the resolution of a commons
problem. This can be done, though not conclusively, by
applying the alternative approach to an examination of some
common-pool cases in actual settings and questioning whether
it aids in organizing and clarifying our understanding of
the processes that occurred in those applications.
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III. The Alternative Approach Applied: Four Groundwater
Basins in Southern California
A. The Cases
For purposes of exploring the possibility of a user-
based resource management system that neither privatizes the
resource nor turns it over to some central public manager,
and for examining the usefulness of the process-based
alternative for organizing our understanding of the
resolution of a commons problem, we turn to a selection of
four common-pool cases. These cases were quite deliberately
chosen. Each is a groundwater basin within the Los Angeles
Basin area. This saves us the complications involved in
comparing a groundwater basin with a fishery with a forest,
and so on. Such cross-resource comparisons are an important
part of the agenda for additional research, as we press the
alternative views presented here into other areas to explore
their general applicability. Choosing all four groundwater
basins in the same general location serves a similar
simplifying purpose, as it saves comparing California's
water problems, water law, and water organizations with
those of some other state or country, or even comparing
southern California's water situation with that of northern
California. This keeps the analysis focused on the process
and the variables during these comparatively early
applications.
No claim is made here that these four groundwater
basins are representative examples of all commons situations
wherever in the world they occur. As a result, no inference
should be drawn that the analysis of these cases "proves"
that all common-pool resources will be saved from overuse
and deterioration and devoted to higher-valued use. The
cases are too similar and too localized for such sweeping
conclusions to be drawn. It is important to underscore that
there are also cases consistent with the predictions of
traditional approaches, where common resources have been
destroyed.
While the cases presented here share a number of
similarities, they are not "clones". They differ on some of
the variables affecting their situations and in some of the
actions taken in the process of resolving their problems.
Even with the similarity of resource type and location,
there are differences among them that are relevant to the
likelihood of collective action, the forms that action took,
and the outcomes attained.
The Raymond Basin is a small groundwater basin
underlying the Pasadena area in Los Angeles County. It is
physically separated from other groundwater basins, and
receives its water primarily from runoff of precipitation in
the San Gabriel Mountains. Water is removed from the Basin
by wells, and is used for residential and commercial
purposes in the local communities.
As those communities grew in the first third of the
20th century, water producers began to steadily extract more
water than was being restored to the Basin by natural
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recharge. Water levels fell, imposing increased costs on
water producers (and consumers) through longer pumping lifts
required to bring the ground water to the surface. Yet each
water producer continued to increase production, thus
aggravating the problem of overdraft in the Basin. By the
1930s, Raymond Basin was in critical overdraft condition.
Raymond Basin was not only geographically small; it had
a relatively small water production industry as well. There
were only about 30 water producers in Raymond Basin in the
1930s. Moreover, that industry was rather concentrated,
with the City of Pasadena accounting for as much groundwater
production as the other producers combined. The City of
Pasadena took the earliest steps to enhance supply through
controlled water spreading, and to discuss the demand side
of the problem with its fellow producers (to no avail).
Subsequently, the City of Pasadena used the California court
system to seek an adjudication of rights to the ground water
in Raymond Basin. That court case lasted nearly thirteen
years, and resulted in a detailed study of the Basin, a
negotiated settlement among the water producers, and a
reduction of aggregate withdrawals to the total sustainable
yield of the resource. In the interim, the producers joined
with other southern California water producers in securing a
supply of imported water from the Colorado River to meet the
difference between the needs of the communities and the
yield of the Basin.
Initially, the Court appointed a Watenuaster to
supervise and monitor the arrangement for the curtailment of
demand. More recently, the local water producers have taken
over this task, through a representative Management Board.
That Board also makes recommendations for adjustments of
pumping patterns to optimize use of the storage capacity of
the Basin. Water levels in the Basin have recovered and
stabilized, periods of drought have been endured, and
compliance with the arrangements is sufficiently high that
available sanctions have not been enforced against any
users.
The West Basin in Los Angeles County covers about four
times the area of Raymond Basin. West Basin lays along the
Pacific Ocean, underlying the beach cities and stretching
from Santa Monica to Long Beach. As a coastal basin, West
Basin is the last basin in a series of groundwater basins
that begins in the San Gabriel Valley. Also because it is a
coastal basin, the underground water-bearing aquifers of
West Basin are exposed to the salt waters of the Pacific
Ocean for several miles.
In West Basin, overdraft conditions became critical in
the early part of this century, and were compounded by the
coastal exposure of the Basin. As underground water levels
fell below sea level, not only did pumping lifts increase,
but salt water from the Pacific invaded the Basin, spoiling
the fresh water supply for the beach cities and moving
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inland. Moreover, in West Basin, there were hundreds of
groundwater producers, rather than a few dozen.
Local water producers pursued five strategies: (l)
organizing themselves into a private water association with
the ability to seek out information about the Basin and to
provide a forum for communication among the members; (2)
acquiring an imported supply of water for the Basin that
would allow for a future reduction in demands upon the
underground supply; (3) using the courts as the Raymond
Basin producers had, as a forum for negotiations among the
producers leading to a reduction in demand (although, again,
the process took sixteen years); (4) developing a mechanism
for the increased flow of water into the Basin from the
Basins "upstream" through the creation of a Replenishment
District that encompassed not only West Basin but the next
"upstream" basin, Central Basin; and (5) creation of a
barrier project to keep the salt water of the Pacific from
further invading the underground water supply. Action in
West Basin began in the early 1940s and continued into the
1970s to complete these five elements of the preservation
and enhancement of West Basin.
Today, West Basin is no longer in critical overdraft
condition, water levels have increased and stabilized, and
the salt-water invasion has been arrested. Although most of
the water supplied to the West Basin community now is
imported, the Basin itself has been preserved as an
important source of water supply and as a source of water
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storage. The Court-appointed Water-master continues to
perform monitoring and reporting functions in West Basin,
although compliance with the various arrangements among the
local water producers has been unproblematic.
The "upstream" neighbor of West Basin is Central Basin,
an even larger resource that stretches from the City of Los
Angeles over to Whittier and down to Long Beach. Central
Basin receives water from still farther upstream in the San
Gabriel Valley, and provides water to West Basin across the
fault zone that separates them. As with West Basin, there
were hundreds of groundwater producers in Central Basin,
providing water for residential, commercial, and
agricultural uses.
Water problems reached a critical stage later in
Central Basin than they did in Raymond and West Basins.
Nonetheless, Central Basin had reached critical overdraft
conditions by 1950, and water levels in wells declined
sharply. Salt water from the Pacific Ocean even began to
intrude into Central Basin in the Long Beach area.
With the assistance of, and some prodding by,
downstream producers in West Basin, Central Basin water
producers began their own water association to provide a
means for information-gathering and dissemination. The
Central Basin producers sought to avoid a costly and time-
consuming adjudication of rights to withdraw ground water,
and managed to accomplish a much briefer and less costly
adjudication by employing lessons learned in the course of
the Raymond and West Basin lawsuits. In the meantime,
Central Basin producers acquired imported water for the
area, and participated in the development of the Central and
West Basin Replenishment District, which purchases imported
water and reclaimed water for recharge of the Basin's
storage capacity. An additional barrier project has
arrested salt-water intrusion in the Long Beach vicinity.
Central Basin water levels have recovered, and the
Basin is no longer considered endangered by a supply-demand
imbalance. The accumulated overdraft in Central Basin has
been reduced by one-half. Monitoring of producers'
reductions in demand is conducted by the Court-appointed
Watermaster in conjunction with the Replenishment District.
Southeast of Central Basin lays the fourth basin in
this study, the Orange County Basin. The Orange County
basin is slightly larger than the Central Basin, and
underlies almost all of the heavily populated areas of the
County. At first, water was extracted from the Orange
County basin primarily for agricultural irrigation, but most
use now is for residential and commercial purposes. The
Orange County basin receives water as the last basin in a
series in the Santa Ana River valley, and, like West Basin,
it is exposed to the Pacific Ocean along the coast.
Because of heavy demand for irrigation, Orange County's
basin was overdrafted very early in this century. Water
levels receded below sea level, and salt-water intrusion
began at two gaps along the shore. Groundwater production
20
continued to increase, and the problems compounded until the
1950s.
The water producers in Orange County have avoided an
adjudication of their rights to withdrawals from the basin,
and thus have been unable to place an effective ceiling on
water demand. The approach to resource management in Orange
County has been to enhance supply to the basin instead of
reducing demand. Water producers prevailed upon the
California legislature to create the Orange County Water
District in the early 1930s. The District has undertaken
lawsuits against "upstream" water producers to protect the
inflow into the Basin, and a large-scale program of
importing and spreading water to recharge the Basin to
accommodate the withdrawals of local producers. The
District has employed incentive programs to induce producers
to substitute imported water for ground water, but has not
eliminated the cost differential that makes ground water
more attractive than imported water. Barrier projects have
been constructed to halt the invasion of salt water from the
Pacific.
Water levels fluctuate considerably in Orange County
due to the absence of a cap on groundwater production, but
for most of the period since 1956, the basin has not been in
critical overdraft condition. Salt-water intrusion has been
contained by the barriers. The continued success of the
Orange County approach to resource management depends
largely on the continued availability of imported water for
basin replenishment.
These four cases share similarities of resource type
and location, but also present different problems in
different circumstances. Their histories, and the elements
of resource management activity in the four basins, differ.
The first important conclusion to be drawn from the cases is
that all of them present examples of recovery from "tragedy
of the commons" situations, while none of them relied upon
the prescribed forms of either total privatization of the
resource or management of the resource by a central public
agent. What remains is to apply the process-based
alternative for understanding such resources and their
preservation and management, and to consider the results
obtained in each of the cases.
B. The Variables
We have presented a series of variables concerning the
resource, the community of users, and the institutional
setting, and the relation of these variables to the
likelihood of successful resolution. In Figure 1, these
variables are reiterated with brief summaries of the status
of the four basins with respect to each of the variables.
(Figure 1 here)
A review of the variables readily yields two
observations. The four basins were favorably situated for
collective action in a number of respects, and the four
basins were quite similar on a number of counts.
Each of the four basins exhibits a low rate of
renewability, either because natural recharge is low
relative to total basin storage capacity or because the
basin is poorly suited to artificial recharge (or, in the
case of West Basin, both). This makes each of the basins
vulnerable to rapid deterioration under conditions of
overuse, yet makes recovery possible if the demand-supply
imbalance is redressed (i.e., these are not totally occluded
basins where all use takes the form of "mining").
All four basins were in considerably endangered
condition prior to and during the process of resolution.
This is vital to spur users to undertake the costs of
organization and altering use patterns. We would not
anticipate that resource users would take actions until they
were experiencing problems. While all four basins were
endangered, there were differences of degree among them,
with West Basin in the most extreme condition of overuse and
contamination.
As is the case with groundwater basins generally, the
four basins exhibited low visibility. The boundaries of the
resources, and thus the extent of the user community, were
not readily apparent to the local users. This presents a
barrier to successful collective action, and indeed was a
prime reason why much of the initial action in each case
focused on the gathering of information about the boundaries
of the resource, the capacity and yield of the resource, the
conditions of the resource, and the identification of the
users. Visibility is one of the variables on which the four
basins were not favorably situated for successful collective
action. In the case of three of the basins, the usual poor
visibility of groundwater basins was compounded by the fact
that the acknowledged boundaries of the basins were not all
well-defined hydrologic divides.
The number of water producers in all but Raymond Basin
was relatively large, but the distribution of interests
among the users was concentrated, though to differing
degrees. Central Basin was the least concentrated, Raymond
Basin the most. Raymond Basin and Orange County each
approached the status of "privileged groups," as the City of
Pasadena in the former and the Irvine Company in the latter
each took actions at the outset despite the fact that their
actions ultimately benefitted all users. The concentrated
distribution of interests in each case was favorable to
collective action, as relatively small groups of users were
able to affect large shares of total groundwater production.
Each user community was relatively homogeneous, being
undivided by language, culture, or other differences that
would impair communication and the possibilities for trust
among the users in working out agreements concerning use.
Only West Basin exhibited a division among the users, and
this was temporary, as the inland cities that were
originally unaffected by sea-water intrusion were reluctant
to join with the beach cities in taxing themselves to
acquire imported water.
In each basin, there was at the outset of collective
action a prosperous community of users capable of bearing
costs in addressing their water problems. The development
of the Los Angeles area yielded booming cities and a
thriving commercial community. That development was itself
facilitated by the use of the ground water supplies of the
area, and in each of the basins some of the proceeds of that
prosperity were able to be redirected to the restoration and
preservation of those water supplies.
Each of the basins had a relatively stable community of
users with a long time horizon, and with partial networks of
interconnection upon which to build more inclusive
instruments of collective decision-making. The cities, in
particular, were long-term users to whom preservation of a
stable and adequate water supply into the future was
important. Unlike other types of users, cities are unable
to come to an area, exploit its resources, and then pick up
and move elsewhere. Similarly, while they are not as
immobile as cities, the water service companies, industrial
firms, and (in Orange County in particular) large
agricultural concerns had considerable stakes in the
preservation of an adequate local water supply well into the
future. And, within the basins, neighboring cities and
neighboring water service companies had extensive other
interactions with each other, and industrial and
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agricultural concerns had connections with one another
through such organizations as area Chambers of Commerce and
the Orange County Farm Bureau. The task that remained was
to build connections among different types of users, so that
cities communicated with industrial producers and water
service companies, etc., concerning the problems they all
faced. The major users of these basins were neither
transients nor total strangers, and this more favorably
situated them for successful collective action.
In each of the basins, there became available an
alternative, though less preferred, source of water. This
made curtailment of demand upon the ground water supply,
though costly, less difficult than it would have been
otherwise, while underscoring for the local users the value
of the less expensive, high-quality, and more stable ground
water supplies.
The institutional setting for each of the basins was
similar and quite favorable to local collective action. In
each basin, users had access to expert information-gathering
capabilities, the ability to make and sustain enforceable
agreements, the ability to devise local institutions with
powers to tax and enforce compliance with whatever
arrangements users established, and access to courts where
information-gathering, communication, collective decision-
making, cost-sharing, share assignments, sanctioning of
behavior, and monitoring could occur or be established. Not
all of the available capacities were used in each basin,
most notably in Orange County where the use of the courts
for intra-basin share assignments was eschewed. The point
here is simply that the capacities were indeed available for
local users if they chose to incorporate them to facilitate
their resolution process.
There were, of course, variables on which the basins
differed. Resource location was one of these. Raymond
Basin was not directly connected to other basins, and was
not exposed to salt-water contamination, and as a result
users in that Basin needed only to address their own demand-
supply imbalance. Both West Basin and Orange County were
located at the extreme downstream ends of their respective
watersheds, and were thus highly exposed to the actions of
upstream users. Each of these two was also a coastal
groundwater basin, highly exposed to salt-water
contamination. Central Basin had a more limited exposure to
salt-water contamination, being vulnerable in the Alamitos
Gap area. Central Basin was also in the position of being
both an upstream basin (with respect to West Basin) and a
downstream basin with respect to the Upper San Gabriel
Valley, and so was also exposed to the actions of upstream
users.
The basins also differ in size, from Raymond Basin's 40
square miles to Orange County's 300 square miles. The
smaller size of Raymond Basin was beneficial to the
prospects of successful collective action there, as
information-gathering and the other necessary steps in the
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resolution process are likely, other things being equal, to
be less difficult and costly than they would be when they
involve a larger resource.
Raymond Basin also stands out from the others with
respect to group size. Each of the other three basins was
being used by hundreds of producers prior to and during the
period of collective action. In Raymond Basin, where there
are only 17 active producers now, there were just 31 fifty
years ago at the outset of the Pasadena v. Alhambra
litigation. Information-gathering, communication,
collective decision-making, and monitoring are each
substantially simpler and less costly when total group size
is 31 as opposed to 500 or 1,000.
If one were to take the set of variables as a whole,
and look across the four basins in an attempt to predict
where successful collective action was most likely to occur
and where it was most likely to occur first, one could make
some tentative observations. Given its favorable
disposition with respect to all of the variables except
visibility, its clear difference in resource and group size,
and a distribution of interests that approached "privileged
group" status, one would anticipate collective action to
occur first and be most likely to succeed in Raymond Basin.
It would be more difficult to predict a second most likely
case: Orange County had a more favorable distribution of
interests, homogeneity of user community, and extent of
other interactions of users than West Basin but had a larger
resource, large group of producers, and was in less extreme
conditions (at least at first) than West Basin. Central
Basin, with its large size, less concentrated distribution
of interests, and more limited exposure, would be the basin
one would anticipate to be last to exhibit collective action
and least likely to be successful, other things being equal.
In terms of a strict chronology, the predictions based on
the variables alone would be incorrect, as the order of
initiation of collective action was in fact Orange, Raymond,
West, Central. (Raymond Basin was, however, first to
complete the seven steps in the process of resolution.) The
variables are not strict conditions, however. They are
indicators of likelihood, and the actual course of
resolution is a course of human action and not easily
subject to deterministic or mechanistic accounts.
C. The Steps in a Process of Resolution
In Chapter Four, the process of resolution of commons
problems was described as involving seven steps:
information-gathering, communication, collective decision-
making, cost-sharing, assignment of shares, establishment of
sanctions, and monitoring. Figures 2 through 8 present
brief summaries of these seven steps in each of the four
basins, focused on the initial (i.e., pre-collective action)
condition, the local agents who initiated action with
respect to those steps, the other institutional capacities
they engaged in the course of action, and the actions taken
and the conditions that prevailed subsequent to action.
(Figures 2 through 8 here)
As with the variables affecting the situations in the
four basins, there are considerable similarities and also
some differences among the basins. Some points are worth
underscoring briefly. First, there was no uniform pattern
to the actions taken in the four basins, though they started
from similar initial conditions. It cannot be inferred that
the initial conditions in the basins "determined" in any
meaningful sense the activities therein, as they proceeded
along different paths from similar starting places. West
and Central Basins come closest to following the same path,
which is not surprising in light of their close physical
connection and the overlap among the actors there.
Second, in each of the four basins there is a mix of
private and public action and leadership, though the mix
differs from one basin to another. In Orange County, for
instance, collective action originated in private and public
arenas, and subsequently the Orange County Water District
became the principal locus of activity. By contrast, action
in Raymond began primarily in public arenas, and has over
time evolved to where the producers' own representative
Board has largely taken over management of the Basin. In
West Basin, the West Basin Water Association was a principal
locus of communication and collective decision-making
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before, during, and after the period of most intensive
activity.
Of course, the most striking difference among the
basins, after review of Figures 2 through 8, is the
difference between Orange County and the other three basins.
In Orange County, because of the closer relationship of the
boundaries and population of the County with the boundaries
of the basin, the Orange County Board of Supervisors was
more actively involved in local leadership than was the Los
Angeles County Board of Supervisors. There was in Orange
County much less use, especially with the establishment of
the Orange County Water District, of other institutional
capacities such as the courts and state agencies than in the
other basins.
But it is in the assignment of shares (Figure 6) that
the contrast is most stark. In Orange County there has been
no assignment of shares to the groundwater supply. The
initial condition regarding rights to use of the Orange
County basin still prevails today. In the other three
basins, firm, tradeable rights based on historical use and
limited in aggregate to sustainable levels were established
through adjudication. The difference in Orange County does
not represent an oversight on the part of water producers
there. As noted in Chapter Eight, those who formed the
Orange County Water District placed an explicit prohibition
upon the District, forbidding it to engage in an intra-basin
determination of rights.
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This raises an important issue for us, if we propose
that a successful resolution would involve action n each of
the seven steps. Does the absence of action to assign
shares in Orange County mean that Orange County represents
an unsuccessful resolution of a commons problem? After all,
water levels have recovered from their 1956 lows and sea-
water intrusion has been halted in Orange County. In what
respects could this be considered unsuccessful? The
response to the question lies in the remaining comparisons,
on issues of exposure, cost, and efficiency.
D. Comparisons of the Four Basins on Four Criteria
Preserving a valuable resource and organizing its use
so as to increase the value it provides for those who rely
upon it are substantial achievements. They may, however, be
attained in such a way as to make these achievements only
temporary and highly vulnerable. Such achievements are also
always bought at a price. That price may be measured in
terms of the financial costs incurred in the process of
resolution, and also in terms of the distributional
consequences of the management activities. Here, we shall
briefly explore the actions that have occurred in the four
basins in terms of their continued exposure to depletion and
contamination, the financial costs incurred by the users,
the comparative benefit of preserving the basins relative to
the alternative of destroying and replacing them, and the
effect of the basin management programs on the distribution
of access and use among the population.
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1. Exposure in the Four Basins
Water supply in the Los Angeles area is inadequate and
unpredictable. To the extent that the achievements in the
four basins have lessened their vulnerability to the
inadequacy and unpredictability of water supply, then we can
say that a lasting resolution has been attained. Otherwise,
temporary improvements have been made that may vanish with
the next extended period of drought.
The first form of exposure to consider is loss of
supplies. In the Raymond Basin, which is self-contained
(being neither an upstream nor a downstream basin), natural
local supply is received directly., in the form of runoff
from the mountains. Raymond Basin water users can do
nothing to regulate the rainfall, but they can attempt to
make maximum use of it when it is plentiful. As has been
noted, the Basin is poorly suited to artificial
replenishment, but various parties in Raymond Basin have
operated local spreading grounds in conjunction with the Los
Angeles County Flood Control District to capture the natural
runoff in the streams that traverse the Basin and allow it
to percolate into the underground reservoir rather than flow
out of the Basin. This action raises underground water
levels during wet periods, which can then be drawn down
during dry periods. By restricting total groundwater
extractions to the long-term safe yield of the Basin, the
Raymond Basin producers have insured that, over long
periods, recharge to the Basin and withdrawals therefrom
will be equal, and long dry cycles can be withstood.
In West Basin, the entire source of natural fresh-
water replenishment is from Central Basin. The reduction
of groundwater withdrawals in Central Basin as a result of
the adjudication there, the spreading of local runoff,
reclaimed water, and imported water, and the maintenance of
a sufficient water level differential between the two Basins
have ensured to West Basin a relatively steady supply of
fresh water. This supply would be highly expected to the
actions of users in Central Basin were it not for the
management scheme adopted for the two basins. The fact that
the replenishment activities are financed by the Central and
West Basin Water Replenishment District gives West Basin
producers a voice in decisions regarding their water supply.
They also pay to support the supply program even though most
of the activity occurs in Central Basin. This fact,
combined with the reduction of groundwater extractions in
West Basin and the reduction in reliance upon Colorado River
water for replenishment, leaves West Basin well able to
withstand extended dry cycles.
Central Basin's natural water supply comes from
upstream, in the Upper San Gabriel Valley. The actions of
Central Basin water producers in securing a guaranteed
minimum inflow across Whittier Narrows into the Montebello
Forebay has markedly reduced their exposure to
irregularities in rainfall and to withdrawals upstream. The
inflow from the Upper San Gabriel Valley is supplemented by
the spreading of local runoff during wet periods, by the
spreading of reclaimed waste water, and by the spreading of
imported water from northern California and the Colorado
River. The imported water supplies have been the most
vulnerable, and the Replenishment District has sought to
minimize reliance upon them. With the reduction in
groundwater extractions in Central Basin, and with the
increase in use of reclaimed waste water, Central Basin is
also positioned to withstand the long cycles of dry years
that southern California experiences.
Orange County has, like Central Basin, secured for
itself a guaranteed minimum inflow from upstream, which has
stabilized its ground water supply conditions to some
degree. But in Orange County, as we have noted several
times, there has been no limitation on groundwater
withdrawals. Each year, the Orange County Water District
attempts to purchase and spread sufficient amounts of
imported water to offset the overdraft caused by groundwater
extractions in excess of the basin's safe yield.
Imported replenishment water is the first form of
imported water cut back by MWD during dry periods; imported
water used for direct service needs receives the higher
priority. Orange County water users have not been induced
to switch their base supply from ground water to imported
direct service water to the degree that users in Central and
West Basins (which are similarly situated physically) have
been. Instead, they have relied for most of their total
water use on ground water while purchasing replenishment
water to make up the overdraft. This has worked so far, for
two reasons. First, during the second half of the last
extended drought cycle, imported Colorado River water was
available in sufficient amounts and at sufficiently low cost
to allow the Water District to purchase enough each year to
offset the annual overdraft and even to reduce part of the
accumulated overdraft. Second, when the availability of
imported replenishment water became constrained after
California's loss of much of its claimed rights to Colorado
River water, the most recent long-term drought cycle abated.
The question that remains for Orange County is what
will happen when the next extended drought begins. There is
no question that another dry cycle will come. The only
question is when it will start because agriculture still
represents a larger share of land use in Orange County than
it does in the three Los Angeles County basins, Orange
County was already more exposed to variability in
precipitation, since water demand for agricultural use
escalates more rapidly in dry periods than does water demand
for residential and commercial uses. With no limitation on
groundwater extractions, with ground water being less
expensive than imported water for direct service use, and
with availability of imported water for replenishment
reduced and its cost significantly higher than in the late
1950s and early 1960s, Orange County is highly exposed to
depletion of its ground water supply when the next dry cycle
occurs. The current favorable conditions in the Orange
County basin must be regarded as transitory and vulnerable.
A second form of exposure to consider is exposure to
contamination. This is not a problem in Raymond Basin,
which is not exposed to the ocean or to upstream polluters.
Any contamination of the groundwater supply in Raymond Basin
would come from indigenous pollution sources, and ground
water quality is assiduously monitored in this Basin as well
as the others for such contaminants. In each of the other
basins, the primary threat to ground water quality has been
from the ocean, and in each case that threat has been
largely eliminated through the construction and operation of
the barrier projects. In West and Central Basins, the
barrier projects are operated using treated imported water
(which is equivalent to direct service water, in priority
and in price). In Orange County, the barrier project is
operated using purified waste water, which assures a supply
of water for the barrier there regardless of precipitation
conditions. The Central and West Basin Water Replenishment
District is exploring the possibility of using purified
waste water in the barrier projects in those basins, thus
further ensuring the supply of barrier water in the future.
In all, then, the four basins may be regarded as not
exposed to contamination threats (unless pollution problems
grow in the future). Three of the four basins may also be
regarded as not exposed to the extreme variations in
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precipitation that are characteristic of the Los Angeles
area. Because of its reliance on imported replenishment
water and the absence of assignment of shares to the ground
water supply, Orange County remains highly exposed to cyclic
fluctuations in local water supply.
2. Basin Management Costs
Basin management costs consist of: watermaster service
expenditures (where applicable), water replenishment
expenditures (where applicable), and adjudication costs
(where applicable). Expenditures cited below are all for
1985, except of course for the adjudication costs, which
were incurred earlier.
Arriving at the adjudication costs requires some
calculation. Simply to treat all adjudication costs as
having been paid in the past and therefore no longer
affecting the calculation of basin management costs would
not be proper (even though those fees have all long since
been paid). It would make for an unfair comparison between
Orange County (where the costs of an intra-basin
adjudication were avoided) and the other basins. Orange
County water users have deliberately avoided this expense,
on the theory that "adjudication never produced one drop of
water". Their approach should be compared with those where
adjudication expenses were incurred in order to see the
savings realized by orange County. So, adjudication costs
in the other three basins have been included by
amortization. Taking the best estimate available of the
total adjudication costs in a basin ($300,000 in Raymond,
$3,000,000 in West, and $450,000 in Central), let us engage
in the following speculation: suppose the parties had, at
the outset of the litigation, borrowed enough money to pay
the entire cost of the adjudication up front, and then had
made annual payments each year thereafter to pay off the
loan. By using a 50-year loan period and a conservative
interest rate (reflecting the times in which the money would
have been borrowed — 1937, 1945, and 1962) of 5%, we obtain
an annual payment for the adjudication that can then be
divided by total groundwater extractions to obtain a current
cost per acre-foot of ground water resulting from the
adjudication of ground water rights within the Raymond,
West, and Central Basins.
The resulting basin management costs are summarized in
Figure 9. Adjudication costs in Raymond Basin work out to
$.50 per acre-foot per year, and watermaster expenditures
for 1985 were $3.00 per acre-foot of ground water, yielding
a total of $3.50 per acre-foot of ground water.
Adjudication costs in West Basin amortize to $2.50 per acre-
foot per year, watermaster expenditures were $2.40, and
Replenishment District expenditures were $72.50 per acre-
foot of ground water, for a total of $77.40 per acre-foot of
ground water in West Basin. In Central Basin, adjudication
costs are calculated at $.11 per acre-foot per year,
watermaster expenditures were $1.16 per acre-foot, and
Replenishment District expenditures were $72.50 per acre-
foot, giving a total of $73.79 per acre-foot of ground
water. In Orange County, Orange County Water District
expenditures were $151.79 per acre-foot of ground water
extracted, which is the total basin management costs since
there were no adjudication costs or separate watermaster
service expenditures (monitoring of groundwater production
is also performed by the OCWD).
It would not appear that Orange County water users have
saved themselves much money by foregoing assignment of
shares. Indeed, the basin management costs in Orange County
are substantially higher than they are for the similarly-
situated Central and West Basins. By avoiding an intra-
basin adjudication putting a ceiling on groundwater
extractions, Orange County has had to invest much more
heavily in additional spreading facilities to provide enough
replenishment capacity to meet the annual overdrafting of
the ground water supply, and has had to purchase more
imported replenishment water than has CWBWRD, even as the
cost of that water has escalated sharply in the first half
of this decade. Preservation of the ground water supply in
West and Central Basins and Orange County has come at a much
higher price than in Raymond Basin. There, the reduction of
pumping to the safe yield of the Basin combined with the
absence of an artificial replenishment program and the need
for a barrier against the sea has kept basin management
costs to just $3.50 per acre-foot per year. Basin
preservation has by far come at the highest price in Orange
County, where the supply-side approach has necessitated much
greater expenditures to accommodate unlimited pumping.
It bears noting that the Orange County basin management
costs, stated in "per acre-foot" terms, should not be
misread as indicating that groundwater producers pay $151.79
per acre-foot in addition to their direct production costs.
If that were the case, Orange County groundwater producers
would probably rely upon imported water to a much greater
degree than they do. The Orange County Water District still
raises a considerable portion of its revenue from property
taxes, so property owners still subsidize groundwater
production. When District expenditures are divided by total
groundwater production, one obtains the $151.79 per acre-
foot figure as the cost of basin management per acre-foot
produced. But the groundwater producer pays only his direct
production costs (estimated at $134.00 per acre-foot) plus
the pump tax of $32.00, for a total of $166.00 per acre-foot
of groundwater produced, rather than $285.79 per acre-foot,
which would be the cost if all basin management costs were
paid by taxing groundwater production.
3. Efficiency Considerations
Each year, the Orange County Water District publishes
estimates of the direct production costs from pumping ground
water, as well as the cost of treated imported MWD water.
Assuming for the sake of this presentation that the direct
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production costs of extracting an acre-foot of ground water
are the same whether the well used is located in Orange
County or in Los Angeles County, we can adopt the 1985
estimate of $134.00 per acre-foot for use in considering the
savings achieved in the four basins from preserving their
ground water supplies relative to total reliance on imported
water at $240.00 per acre-foot.
A groundwater basin can be used in more than one way.
The water supplied by the basin can be used to meet the base
supply needs of the users, or the basin can be used as a
storage facility to provide water for peak and emergency use
while base supply needs are met from surface and imported
supplies. Given the growth in total water use in each of
the four basins, if the water users had pursued the first of
these methods, each of the four basins would have been
destroyed by now, by depletion or by contamination or both.
Had this occurred, the provision of a water supply to the
population and commerce of these areas would now require
use of imported direct service water to meet 100 percent of
total water use. However, because of the variability of
supply of imported water (i.e., there are wet and dry
seasons within each year and there are wet and dry years),
and because of the variability of demand for water (i.e.,
water needs at the peak hour of the peak day of the peak
season may be as much as twenty times the average rate of
use), considerable investment would have to be made in
storage facilities to replace those provided naturally by
the groundwater basins. In order to evaluate whether the
price that has been paid for preservation of the groundwater
basins has been worth it to the local users, we need to find
some way of estimating the costs they would be incurring for
their water supply if they had allowed the basins to be
destroyed.
In order not to overstate the case, we will proceed as
follows. We will take the lowest estimate found of the
amount of surface storage capacity required to make up for
the loss of the underground system. This is an estimate
that storage facilities would have to be constructed
equivalent to 16 percent of total water use. We will then
use the lowest estimate available of the capital cost of
constructing that amount of surface storage in each of the
basins, $57,440 per acre-foot. We then amortize this
construction at 5% per year over a 50-year period, as was
done with adjudication costs earlier, to obtain an annual
cost of the construction of the required surface storage.
Finally, we include no cost for annual maintenance of these
surface storage facilities — i.e., we will assume that they
never need cleaning, repainting, or repairs, thus treating
them as equivalent to natural underground storage.
The results of these calculations are presented in
Figure 9. We will work through the calculations for Raymond
Basin as an example of how the calculations were performed
for all four basins. In Raymond Basin, where the current
mix of ground water and imported water is 54% to 46%,
calculating ground water at $134.00 per acre-foot plus the
$3.50 basin management costs and imported water at $240.00
per acre-foot, an average acre-foot of water costs $184.65.
If Raymond Basin water users were totally reliant on
imported water, they would require 8,571 acre-feet of
storage capacity (.16 times total water use of 53,567 acre-
feet), which at $57,440 per acre-foot would cost
$492,318,240.00. Annual payments for this construction
would be $27,248,400.00, or $508.68 per acre-foot of water
used. Adding this to the $240.00 per acre-foot cost of
imported direct service water yields a total of $748.68 per
acre-foot of water in Raymond Basin. Since an acre-foot of
water is the average annual demand for a five-person
household, we can translate this difference between $184.65
per acre-foot under the current system and $748.68 per acre-
foot under the alternative as the difference between an
average monthly water bill of $15.00 and an average monthly
water bill of $62.50. The alternative costs of water for
each of the other basins can also be seen in Figure 9.
Even with conservative estimates of the cost of
replacing the groundwater basins in this study with surface
storage and imported water, it appears that basin
preservation has been a good bargain. We are unable to make
efficiency determinations of the type that would indicate
whether basin management costs are as low as they can
possibly be in each of these basins, and there is no reason
to presume that they are, but we can conclude that the basin
management costs being paid in each of the basins are
considerably less than the costs the water users in these
areas would be facing if the basins had been destroyed.
4. Distributional Considerations
In each of the basins there has been a reduction in the
number of entities producing ground water. The question now
becomes how to evaluate this phenomenon.
There is no doubt that in West and Central Basins, the
adjudication process itself eliminated many of the small
producers. They abandoned groundwater production rather
than pay the costs of defending their right to a few acre-
feet or less of ground water. This occurred despite the
fact that the ground water industry in each of these two
basins was sufficiently concentrated that a smaller group of
large producers could have curtailed their use and preserved
the basins by their own actions. The impact of the
production by the very small producers on aggregate
groundwater extractions would have been minimal. Yet in the
adjudications of those basins, the parties sought to spread
the costs over the total set of producers, even though this
resulted in the elimination of most of them from production.
Those small producers, had they not been eliminated, could
today still be pumping their one or two acre-feet per year
and enjoying the lower cost and high quality of the ground
water instead of having to acquire imported water.
There are, however, other considerations that counsel
caution in attributing all of the reduction in the number of
small pumpers to the adjudication process. Some small
pumpers were agricultural producers. As land use in the
area has changed from agricultural to residential and
commercial, several of these producers sold their farmland
to real estate developers, and so would not have been
pumping ground water anymore regardless of the onset of
adjudication.
In Orange County, where there has been no intra-basin
adjudication of rights, many more small producers have
continued production of ground water. Given the physical
similarity of Orange County with Central and West Basins, it
is therefore reasonable to suppose that many more small
producers would also have continued production in those
basins had it not been for adjudication (although it should
be reiterated that irrigated agriculture represents a larger
share of land use in Orange County, so again, not all of the
differences can be attributed solely to adjudication). This
discussion does not relate as strongly to Raymond Basin, as
the ground water industry there was small to begin with and
remains so, and during the process of adjudication itself
the number of parties declined only from 31 to 25.
If the criterion one uses to evaluate the
distributional consequences of the actions in the various
basins is the effect on the small vs. large producers, one
would therefore conclude that Orange County's approach has
been considerably more equitable than that of West and
Central Basins. Small producers have not been chased out of
the ground water industry in Orange County, and continue to
derive substantial benefits from being able to produce their
own water from underground rather than having to purchase it
from others.
However, there is another aspect to distribution. In
addition to the issue of whether the large producers could
have suffered the small producers to continue production
(which they surely could have) by omitting them from the
assignment of shares, there is the issue of whether the
value of rights to groundwater production has been
appropriately reflected in the various basins. In Orange
County, the absence of an assignment of shares to the
groundwater supply means that there are no tradable
groundwater rights in Orange County — rights remain
usufructory and hence untradable. Small producers thus
continue to produce, but we cannot be sure whether they do
so because they prefer their groundwater rights to whatever
compensation they could receive for them or because they
simply have no other option but to use their right to
produce as opposed to buying water from another source.
In Raymond, West, and Central Basins, there has been
further reduction in the number of parties owning rights
since the end of the adjudication process in each of those
basins. In other words, parties who went through the
adjudication process, paid the costs thereof, and acquired
decreed rights to groundwater production nonetheless have
disposed of their rights subsequently. In Raymond Basin,
the 25 parties who completed the adjudication process are
now 17. In West Basin, 99 parties were decreed to have non-
zero rights in 1961; now there are 74, of whom only 37 are
active pumpers (the rest lease their rights to the 37). In
Central Basin, there were 508 parties with pumping
allocations in the first year after the judgment; there are
184 now, of whom 116 are active pumpers. In these basins,
parties with rights have four options: (a) exercise their
rights to pump in full; (b) sell their rights in full and
become water consumers instead of water producers; (c)
retain their rights for future use but lease them to another
for current use; and (d) some combination of the other three
options — i.e., pump some, sell some, lease some.
This other aspect of distribution, then, is whether
rights to ground water are possessed by those who most value
them. In Raymond, West, and Central Basins, we cannot
presume that the market for water rights works perfectly.
We cannot therefore conclude that groundwater rights are
entirely in the hands of those who most value them. We can,
however, at least observe that the capacity exists for those
who value their water rights less than others to exchange
them with those others for something they value sore. We
are then able to infer that, when a water right owner ceases
production and transfers his right to another, he has made a
judgment about the resolve value of his right and has
received some form of sensation for it that he deems
acceptable.
By contrast, in Orange County, when a groundwater
producer ceases production and becomes a water consumer
rather than a water producer, it is much less clear what we
are to make of that action. The number of ground water
producers pumping 25 acre-feet per year or less in Orange
County has declined from 780 in 1970 to 250 in 1985. All
that we can say of the 530 small producers who have given up
ground water production in those 15 years is (a) that they
did not continue their groundwater production, and (b) that
they received no compensation when they ceased that
production.
Our conclusions, then, are mixed on the issue of the
distributional consequences of the actions taken in the four
basins. The process of adjudication undoubtedly eliminated
several small producers from access to and use of the basins
(especially West and Central), even though they could have
been excluded from that process. The absence of an
adjudication process in Orange County likely accounts for
the continued presence of 250 relatively small ground water
producers there. However, had the small producers in West
and Central Basins been omitted from the adjudication of
rights, they would also have ended up with no firm, tradable
shares that they could exchange with others who valued them
more. In Orange County, there is no way to determine that
groundwater production is being pursued by those who value
it most; one can only say that groundwater production is
pursued by those who value it more than not producing. In
the other basins, there is at least the possibility that
rights to groundwater production have moved from those who
valued them less to those who valued them more.
IV. Summary: Getting Out of the Commons Trap
These cases demonstrate quite plainly that common-pool
resources (a) do not have to be destroyed simply because
multiple individuals or firms have claims to their use, (b)
do not have to be converted from common property
arrangements to some other form of property arrangements in
order for destruction to be averted, and (c) do not have to
be managed by a central government manager or converted to
individually-held private property in order to be devoted to
a higher-valued use. Despite the fact that no claim is made
for their representativeness, these cases do at least show
that it is possible for commons problems to be resolved by
the users themselves. They refute each of the alternative
contentions in the literature, i.e., that overall
governmental control is "required", or that privatization of
natural resources is "the only way", to ensure optimal use.
The cases also support the recommendation of the National
Academy of Sciences Panel on Common Property Resource
Management that policymakers should first investigate
whether management arrangements have been established by
local users before the imposition of one of the "package"
solutions of the literature on commons situations.
In addition, these cases appear to support the utility
of a process-based alternative approach to the understanding
of the resolution of commons problems. The seven-step
process illuminates not only the elements of user-based
resource management, but also helps in identifying potential
weaknesses in a resource management system (as with Orange
County's choice of foregoing assignment of shares). In a
simple case comparison, the identification of a set of
variables making resolution more or less likely aids in our
understanding of the prospects for initiation and the
prospects for successful completion of collective action
among the users in the four cases. There would appear to be
reason for further pursuit of this approach, for its
usefulness for analysts of common-pool resource situations,
and for its usefulness as a guide to action for resource
users seeking a way out of the commons "trap".
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Basin Management Costs and Savings per Acre-Foot from Basin
Management in the Four Basins
Raymond West Central Orange
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